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Did Option Traders Predict the Korean Financial Crisis of 1997?

Abstract
This paper examines KOSPI200 options prices in order to investigate whether implied
volatility implicit in options prices foreshadowed the 1997 financial crisis in Korea. A
set of call and put implied volatilities are examined for evidence of expectations prior to
October 23, 1997 of an impending financial crisis. It is shown that implied volatilities
from out-of-the-money calls were relatively higher than those from otherwise identical
puts during the period preceding October 23, 1997. Thereafter, however, put implied
volatilities became extremely high relative to call implied volatilities. These results
indicate no strong fears about the financial crisis during the three months immediately
preceding the financial crisis, so KOSPI200 options prices indicate that options traders
failed to detect the financial crisis prior to October 23, 1997.

Did Option Traders Predict the Korean Financial Crisis of 1997?

1. Introduction
The initial suddenness and the volatility of the Asian financial crisis caught many
financial observers by surprise. An important question is whether a group of financial
market participants whose main business is to predict volatility, options traders, were able
to anticipate the potential influence of the Asian crisis on markets. The purpose of this
paper is to examine whether options prices in the Korean capital market were informative
in estimating future market movements leading up to the financial crisis.
When the trading of standardized index option contracts on an index of 200
stocks listed on Korea Stock Exchange (KOSPI200) commenced in Korea in July, 1997,
Korea’s economy was already suffering from the first effects of the Asian crisis. 1 A real
sense of panic did not encompass market participants, however, until Standard & Poor
downgraded Korea’s foreign debt rating on October 23, 1997. Upon release of the
information, the stock market index experienced its biggest single-day drop (-5.2%) in
history. Since option prices are based on the collective assessment of market participants’
about future market volatility, information contained in option prices could potentially
provide clues regarding the impending crisis.
This study examines the informational content of KOSPI200 options prices traded
between July 1997 and March 1998 in order to determine whether implied volatility
implicit in options prices foreshadowed the 1997 financial crisis in Korea. The study
examines the ability of an options market, that had existed only for a few months, to

1

The KOSPI200 is a value-weighted index composed of 200 stocks from a broad range of industries which
comprise nearly 70% of the total market capitalization in Korea.
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predict significant events with potential to affect market prices, so the market could
potentially exhibit different features from options trading in established market such as in
the United States and United Kingdom. The primary question addressed in this paper is
whether option traders detected the impending financial crisis prior to the release of the
news on October 23, 1997.
It can be argued that a financial crisis can be thought of as an episode of
extreme financial market volatility.

A standard approach for determining whether

options market participants predicted the Korean economic crisis in 1997 would therefore
be to examine if implied volatility in the Korean options market predicted subsequent
volatility.
Numerous studies have looked at the issue of whether implied volatility improves
upon historical volatility when predicting subsequent volatility in general. Studies by
Latane and Rendlemen (1976), Chiras and Manaster (1978), Fleming et al (1995), and
Christensen and Prabhala (1998) support the use of implied volatility. In contrast, Day
and Lewis (1992) as well as Canina and Figlewski (1993) found that implied volatility
tended to be a biased and inefficient predictor of future volatility. Few studies have
looked at the specific question of whether implied volatility can be used to predict
individual financial crises, however, presumably due to the limited number of
independent implied volatility observations which could be used for statistical testing and
the potential non- stationarity of the data in a crisis.
Bates (1991) developed a technique that uses put and call option prices in order to
determine whether stock index options market participants predicted the 1987 United
States stock market crash. This approach was subsequently extended by Gemill (1996)
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who used put and call option implied volatility in order to determine whether United
States and United Kingdom option market participants predicted the 1987 crash. Bates
(1991) and Gemmill (1996) build upon the observation that variations in put and call
prices and implied volatility across different exercise prices can provide information
about the market’s beliefs concerning the entire probability distribution of future market
events.
Gemmill (1996) compares implied volatility from out-of-the-money put options
with implied volatility from otherwise identical call options.

This is a potentially

effective test of whether option traders predict a market crash because option traders
correctly anticipating an impending crash would find it profitable to purchase out-of-themoney put options in anticipation of a large decline in stock prices. This increased
demand should make out-of-the-money put options expensive relative to otherwise
identical calls, leading to relatively higher put implied volatility than call implied
volatility during the period preceding a market crash. In this paper we adopt the Gemill
(1996) approach for determining whether variations in implied volatility in the Korean
index options market provided evidence of expectations of an impending financial crisis
in Korea prior to the most severe days of the crisis in late October, 1997.
Results show that there is no persistence in relatively higher put options prices
than otherwise identical call options price over the sample period preceding October 23,
1997. This possibly suggests that option traders failed to detect the impending financial
crisis from various economic woes. It is in fact interesting to notice that prices actually
shifted in a direction contrary to prediction at each stage of the crisis.

3

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an
overview of the Korean economy, stock market performance during the Korean financial
crisis, and features of KOSPI200 options. Methodology using market participants’
aggregate subjective distribution of stock return, as measured by a set of out-of-themoney call and put option prices, is presented in section 3. Section 4 contains results and
discussion while some concluding remarks contained in section 5 end the paper.

2. Genesis of the Korean crisis 2
It is widely believed that the Asian financial crisis had its origin in Thailand and
was precipitated by speculative attacks on the Thai baht peg when its value began to
appear excessive given a weakening economy, a balance of trade deficit and banking
sector problems related to excessive corporate leverage as well as property speculation.
As a result the Thai central bank announced a managed float of the baht and called on the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for technical assistance on July 2, 1997. The Asian
crisis quickly spread to other emerging South East Asian countries, including South
Korea. At first Korea was considered to be immune from the financial turmoil buffeting
the Thai and Indonesian economies, but a series of bankruptcies by a few leading Korean
companies combined with the effects of the South East Asian economic turmoil help
precipitate a financial crisis in Korea as well. Korea’s economic problems became acute
during the latter half of 1997, culminating in a bailout assistance from the IMF on
December 3, 1997 just fifteen days prior to a presidential election.

2

Sources for material in this section include the International Harold Tribune, Korea Politics Company
Special Report (1997) and the Samsung Economic Institute.
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It can be argued that the roots of Korea’s economic problems began to emerge as
early as 1993 when Korean companies used foreign borrowing to finance aggressive
expansion via the building of factories for products such as automobiles, ships,
petrochemicals, and steel. Companies in neighbouring countries such as China, Japan,
and Malaysia were also expanding in similar areas, however, leading to a situation where
supply outpacing demand caused a drop in prices of key exports. As a result, Korea’s
current account deficit grew to US$ 23.7 billion or 4.7% of GDP in 1996.
The first obvious sign of trouble in the Korean economy hit the market in January
1997 when Hanbo Group, the fourteenth largest conglomerate in Korea, collapsed,
leaving US$ 6.7 billion in bad loans. Hanbo had accumulated debts that were nearly
twenty times as much as the company’s net assets, and had expanded into steel by
building a steel mill in 1994 even though steel was not one of Hanbo’s core business lines
and the sector was suffering from over-capacity.

The Hanbo case illustrated the

difficulties facing Korea’s largest firms which caused financial companies to panic and
call in corporate loans. Liquidity thus disappeared, leading to a series of bankruptcies of
over-leveraged companies which left financial companies with ever-increasing nonperforming loans so that in early 1997 the level of non-performing loans was over 70% of
banks’ equity.
On July 15, 1997 the Kia Motor Company, the third largest car company in
Korea, sought bankruptcy protection with US$10 billion in bad loans. The timing of the
crisis could not have been worse as Korea was on the eve of a presidential election and
the government was therefore not inclined towards controlling the impending financial
collapse. The government’s failure to resolve Kia’s bankruptcy quickly or satisfactorily
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deepened fears of an impending crisis. A deep sense of the impending crisis cristalized
when, on October 22, 1997, the government instructed state-run Korean Development
Bank to convert $3.2 billion of its loan to Kia Motors into an equity stake. It further
intensified the following day when Standard & Poor’s cut the rating of Korean foreign
debt in response to the government’s decision that day to nationalize Kia.
The compounding of events made foreign investors accelerate their exodus from
the Korean capital market. The amount of money exiting the Korean stock market in
October of 1997 was nearly three times the quantity in September, causing the exchange
rate and stock market to drop significantly over this period (Samsung Economic Research
Institute). Foreign banks slashed credit lines by more than US$30 billion in the fourth
quarter of 1997, and net usable official foreign exchange reserves plunged to less than $5
billion in mid-December from more than $30 billion at the beginning of the year. This
rapid deterioration meant Korea was on the verge of defaulting on its heavy foreign debt
obligations that had been built up during half a decade of rapid corporate expansion. The
government therefore announced on November 21, 1997, that it was discussing details of
a bailout package with the IMF. After more than a week of intense negotiations, the IMF
agreed to a US$57 billion package on December 3, 1997, the largest in the IMF’s
history. 3
A turning point in the crisis came on December 24, 1997 when the newly elected
president steadfastly pledged to follow the terms of the IMF agreement. This lead to an
acceleration in the rate of implementation of the assistance programme which,
consequently, resulted in Korea escaping the risk of a debt moratorium.

3

Figures are obtained from “International Herald Tribune” and “Korea Country Risk Report(March 11,
1998)”.
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2.1 Financial Market Performance During the Korean Crisis
The Korean stock market initially ignored the Hanbo bankruptcy on January 23,
1997, and continued to rise until mid-February (see Figure 1). Thereafter the KOSPI200,
Korea’s stock market index, began to decline. The fall accelerated on March 19, 1997
when Sammi Steel Co., the twenty-sixth largest company in Korea, defaulted on a loan
(see Table 1 for a chronology of important events in the Korean economic crisis). The
KOSPI200 declined by 4.5% for three consecutive days in response to this news. The
Korean won (unit of the Korean currency) also fell sharply and the Korea Central Bank
used US$3 billion in official foreign exchange reserves by the end of March in an effort
to support the currency (see Table 1).
Figure 1 and Table 1 about here
The value of the Korean currency and interest rates subsequently stabilized during
the second quarter of 1997, and the stock market actually increased by nearly twenty per
cent during the quarter. However, bankruptcies in the summer, especially that of Kia
Motor Company on July 15, 1997, soon created renewed capital market suspicions as to
the soundness of the Korean economy. When Kia failed to make some payments on its
US$10 billion debt, Korea First Bank, the main creditor to Kia and Hanbo, required a
bailout in August 1997. As Thailand entered into an agreement with IMF for bailout in
August 1997, foreign investors began to distrust the soundness of Asian economies in
general and consequently cut credit lines or demanded a higher premium on loans to most
Korean banks. As a result, for the first time ever the Korean won exceeded 900 to the US
dollar on August 19, 1997. Despite those early negative signs, the stock market did not
react strongly until late August when the exchange rate hit a new record low.
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A real sense of crisis engulfed market participants when Standard & Poor cut
Korea’s foreign debt rating on October 23, 1997 in response to the news that the Korean
government would take over debt-ridden Kia Motors. The following day, the Korean
currency plunged, with share prices taking their biggest single-day drop in history. On
October 28, 1997, Korea’s currency ended at 953 to the US dollar despite central bank
intervention, and share prices fell by 6.5%. On November 17 the Korea Central Bank
announced it would no longer defend the value of the Korean currency and the won
immediately fell its daily limit from 986 won to the US dollar level to 1008.6.
The announcement by the Korean government on November 21, 1997 that it was
discussing details of a bail-out package with the IMF in response to the rapid
deterioration in its external financial position caused the stock market to drop by 3.3%.
The IMF agreed to a $57 billion bail-out package on December 3, but the situation
actually worsened due to political uncertainty because two presidential candidates
announced that they would renegotiate the agreement if elected. This further undermined
foreign investor confidence and the exchange rate collapsed to nearly 2000 won to the US
dollar at the end of December and three-year corporate bond rates rose above thirty
percent. Share prices fell a further twenty-five percent in December.
After the newly elected president pledged to meet the IMF agreement terms,
Korea’s capital markets finally began to recover and by early March 1998 the stock price
index had returned to the same level as a year earlier. A gradual return to stability
following the jump to an extreme level of volatility during the final quarter of 1997 is
illustrated in Figure 2 which plots the annualized standard deviation of the daily return of
the KOSPI200 index during 1997 and early 1998.

8

Figure 2 about here
2.2 The Korean Options Market
Options on the KOSPI200 stock index began trading on the Korean Stock
Exchange in July 1997 just prior to the full onset of the Korean economic crisis. Trading
was quiet at first but soon intensified as the economic crisis worsened. A daily average
of only 1,246 contracts were traded in July 1997 whereas trading had peaked at a level of
nearly 83,000 contracts per day by December 1997 (see Table 2 which displays daily
trading volume of KOSPI200 options contracts from July 1997 through March 1998).
Table 2 about here
Table 2 also shows that the trading volume of call options increased significantly
from October through December 1997 when serious financial turmoil enveloped Korea’s
capital market. During these three months, the average daily trading volume of call
options was 46,365, which was nearly five times as many as that of put options.
Thereafter, trading volume of call options dropped significantly. From January 1998
through March 1998, the average daily trading volume was 20,260 for call options and
19,747 for put options.
The KOSPI200 option contract size is set at 100,000 times the level of the index.
The minimum tick size is 0.01 points of the index for an options contract with a premium
of three points or more. The maturities of the options contracts are the three consecutive
near-term months plus three additional months from a quarterly cycle (March, June,
September, and December). KOSPI200 options are European. The last trading day of the
options contracts is the second Thursday of each contract month.

The expiration

settlement price is the day’s final KOSPI200 index level. Settlement is conducted on the
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business day following the contract’s expiration. The first trading day of a new contract
is the first trading day following the last trading day for the expiring contract.
Options trading hours are from 09:00-11:30 for the morning session and 13:0015:15 for the afternoon session, with the option market closing fifteen minutes after the
stock market closes. Trading is executed through a computerised trading system.
Precedence is given to orders with price priority followed by time priority.

3. Methodology and Data
Since options are agreements to buy or sell an underlying asset at some future
date at a predefined exercise price, variations in options prices across exercise prices are
useful in deriving the market’s perception of future price volatility of the underlying
asset. A basic insight into this belief is that option prices are determined by market
participants’ aggregate expectation regarding the likelihood of the price of the underlying
asset finishing in-the-money. Variations in option prices across exercise prices could
therefore incorporate information about the market’s expectations for future movements
in the underlying asset. Gemmill (1996) compares implied volatility from out-of-themoney put options with implied volatility from otherwise identical call options in order to
test whether option traders in the U.S. and U.K. could predict the 1987 market crash. In
this paper we adopt this methodology to examine variations in implied volatilities across
exercise prices of puts and calls of KOSPI200 options to test whether option traders could
foretell the financial crisis that afflicted Korea in October of 1997. Option traders
anticipating a market crash would purchase out-of-the-money put options with the
expectation that the large drop in stock prices will sharply increase the put option’s value.
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Thus an assessed risk of impending market crash would make out-of-the-money put
options unusually expensive relative to otherwise identical calls, leading to relatively
higher put implied volatility than call implied volatility during the period preceding the
market crash.
3.1 Theoretical Framework
In the Black-Scholes framework, it is assumed that stock prices follow a constant
variance diffusion process, where over any finite interval a log price is normally
distributed with the mean centered at the risk-free rate. If markets were to price options
according to the Black-Scholes model, the implied volatilities should not vary across
exercise prices. Evidence shows that the Black-Scholes model performs reasonably well
only for at-the-money-options. Discrepancies between the market and Black-Scholes
prices are large and systematic. 4 For this reason, it is conceivable that different options on
the same underlying asset might have different Black-Scholes implied volatilities. The
pattern of implied volatility across exercise prices is known as a “volatility smile”.
Under the risk neutral distribution hypothesis, the price of a European call or put
option is the discounted expected payoff conditional upon the underlying asset value
finishing in-the-money. Bates (1991) employs the insight that since the value of an option
depends on the probability of the option finishing in-the-money, prices of European call
options will reflect conditions in the upper tail of the risk neutral distribution while put
option prices will reflect conditions in the lower tail. Under conditions of symmetric risk
neutral distribution prices of out-of-the-money call options should be identical to
4

For instance, Rubinstein (1985) examined option prices traded on the CBOE between August 1976 and
August 1978. In his study, he divided the sample into two sub-samples, and showed that implied volatility
was higher for options with lower exercise price in the first sample period but the reverse was found in the
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otherwise similar out-of-the-money European put options. The prices would deviate only
if the underlying distribution is skewed. Consequently, a shift in the skewness of the
underlying distribution identified through an analysis of out-of-the-money put and call
option prices can provide information about the market’s perception of future movements
in the underlying asset price. Gemmill (1996) extends the Bates methodology by
observing that if the underlying distribution is skewed the volatility smile should also be
skewed. An interesting question, therefore, is whether changes in the volatility smile
reflect past movements in the underlying asset or are a prediction of the future.
Given that options are forward looking in nature, changes in the volatility smile
could be attributed to changes in market participants’ aggregate expectations about future
events. For example, a bullish sentiment would result in a significant increase in the
demand, and consequently the price, of deep out-of-the-money call options thus leading
to relatively higher call implied volatility. Likewise, a bearish sentiment would result in a
significant increase in the demand, and consequently the price, of deep out-of-the-money
put options thus leading to relatively higher put implied volatility. While the former
situation is likely to result in a positive skewness of the volatility smile and by extension
the underlying distribution, the latter will

have the opposite effect.

Bates (1991)

developed a skewness premium measure as the percentage deviation in the price of x%
out-of-the-money call options from the price of otherwise similar put options in an effort
to detect skewness in the risk neutral distribution prior to the 1987 market crash. 5 Bates’

second sample period. These results suggest that systematic deviations from the Black-Scholes model
appear to exist, but the pattern of deviations varies over time.
5
SK(x)=  C t ( + x %) − P t ( − x %)  × 100
where SK(x) is the skewness premium, C is the call


P t ( − x %)


price, P is the put price, and x denotes an exercise price which is x% above and below the forward price.
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skewness premium would be negative if the volatility of returns increases as the market
falls, or if option traders forecast a downward movement in prices. Likewise, a positive
premium would result if the volatility of returns increases as stock prices increase or
traders collectively anticipate positive jumps in future stock prices.
Gemmill (1996) uses a modified version of the Bates (1991) skewness
statistic by using implied volatilities of out-of-the-money call and put options rather than
option prices. Since option prices are almost linear in volatility, there should be little
difference between the price based skewness measure of Bates and a measure based on
volatility. In this study, we adopt the Gemmill’s skewness measure to capture the
variation in the implied volatility across exercise prices.

 σ (+2%) − σ t (− 2%) 
skewness measure t =  t
 ×100
σ
(
+
2
%)

t

where,

(1)

σt (+2%) : implied volatility from call option with exercise price,
which is 2% above the forward price
σt (-2%) : implied volatility from put option with exercise price,
which is 2% below the forward price.
2% out-of-the-money options are chosen for analysing volatility smile because

these options are most heavily traded over the sample period, thereby avoiding the
problems of thin trading. 6 However, since finding an option with exercise price exactly
2% above the current forward price is difficult, the relevant implied volatilities are
linearly interpolated.
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3.2 Data
To ensure reliable analysis, a contemporaneous set of put and call option prices
should ideally be used. Prices of call and put options from as close to the end of trading
of the underlying shares in the KOSPI200 were used (3:00 pm).
Daily transaction data for call and put options on KOSPI200 as well as the closing
spot price of the KOSPI200 were collected from the Korean Stock Exchange. On each
day, implied volatilities for put and call options with up to four exercise prices are
calculated. Implied volatility is computed from the last transaction of at-the-money call
option with nearest time to maturity before 3:00 p.m. Since the KOSPI200 contains
mostly dividend-paying stocks, call and put implied volatilities implicit in options prices
are estimated using the dividend-adjusted Black-Scholes option pricing formula. In
addition, the analysis is shifted to the next contract if the remaining time to maturity is
five days or less because maturity less than five days could be too short to contain much
information about future volatility.
Results indicate that the implied volatilities for KOSPI 200 options observed at a
given point in time vary systematically across the different exercise prices. Figure 3
depicts the averages of implied volatility for call options across exercise prices.
Figure 3 about here
Regularity in implied volatility differences across the different exercise prices suggests
the existence of systematic factors that lead investors to price particular options higher or
lower relative to others. The figure also shows that traders pay relatively higher prices for
call options with lower exercises prices than for those with higher exercise prices,
suggesting that the risk-neutral distribution is negatively skewed relative to a normal
6

Bates (1991) shows that results are not sensitive to use of alternative ranges, such as 2%, 4% or 6%.
14

distribution. In addition, it can also be detected from Figure 3 that the nearest at-themoney call options have higher implied volatility than in and out-of-the-money call
options. One possible explanation for this result is that option traders pay liquidity
premium for at-the-money options because in-the-money and out-of-the-money options
are relatively illiquid and thus trade less frequently than those close to at-the-money.

4. Results and discussion
We first examine the levels of at-the-money put and call implied volatilities,
shown in Figure 4, during the period leading up to the crisis and over the crisis period.
Figure 4 about here
The striking result from Figure 4 is that the level of call implied volatilities is
systematically different from the level of put implied volatilities over the whole sample
period. Dividing the sample into “pre-crisis” and “crisis” periods, however, paints a
different picture. Despite a plethora of events pointing towards a potential crisis prior to
the actual downgrade of Korea’s sovereign debt the put implied volatilities remained
significantly lower than call implied volatilities.
Four days before the news of the downgrade on October 23, 1997, the put implied
volatility began to exceed call implied volatility, suggesting an increase in assessment of
downside potential. However, the day before the news, fears subsided concurrently with
the stock market rising 6.3% and the call implied volatility becoming higher than put
implied volatility. This inexplicable improvement in the market just prior to the
precipitation of the crisis suggests that the higher put implied volatility just a few days
before October 23, 1997 might be a reflection of past continuous decline in stock prices
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rather than a prediction of impending financial turmoil. The 21.23% decline in the stock
market over the period from September 19 to October 18, 1997 was presumably a major
contributor to this perception of downside risk.
Figure 4 shows that the put implied volatilities, during the crisis period, are
significantly greater than call implied volatilities. This suggests that the onset of the
financial crisis, as inferred by investors from S&P’s downgrade of Korea’s foreign debt,
led investors to price put options significantly higher than otherwise identical call
options. Table3 contains results for the call and put implied volatilities computed over the
entire sample period as well as the two sub-periods. While the average of call and put
implied volatilities for the full sample is 63.31%, there is significant variation over the
two sub-periods: volatility increases from 27.42% in the pre-crisis period to 90.23%
during the crisis period.
Table 3 about here
A surprising result over the pre-crisis period is that the put implied volatilities (24.99%)
are, on average, nearly five percentage points lower than call implied volatilities
(29.86%) even though the precipitation of the crisis was not a total surprise. This suggests
that although there were events that foretold the onset of the crisis option traders
misinterpreted the signals and were rather bullish about the immediate future. However,
the average put implied volatility (106.69%) during the crisis period is nearly 33
percentage points higher than the average call implied volatility (73.78%), suggesting
that traders interpreted the downgrade of Korea’s foreign debt as the true onset of the
crisis. Although this implication is difficult to prove, the increase in negative sentiment is
supported by the significant increase in the trading volume of put options immediately
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after the downgrade. The ratio of trading volume of put options to total volume increased
from 0.203 during the pre-crisis period to 0.3254 during the crisis period (see Table 1).
Table 4 about here
Table 4 contains results for the volatility smiles for puts and call options. For the
total sample period, 2% out-of-the-money puts have an average volatility of 72.0%,
which is indistinguishable from 71.67% average for at-the-money. Similarly, at-themoney call implied volatility is 54.95%, which is hardly greater than the 54.65% average
for 2% out-of-the-forward calls. These rather flat profiles observed in both the pre-crisis
and the crisis periods suggest that the average volatility smile is small. Alternatively, in
this study the average volatility smile is captured by the skewness measure computed
using equation 1. The results for the skewness measures are contained
in the last column of Table 3. If investors detected the impending financial crisis for the
pre-crisis period, then the average skewness measure would have negative a value.
However, for the pre-crisis period the average skewness measure is 10.96%, suggesting
an assessment of upside potential rather than risk of financial crisis. This, however, gets
reversed with the downgrade of the Korean debt. The average skewness measure for the
crisis sample period is –54.9% indicating that option traders paid extremely high prices
for puts relative to otherwise identical call options during the crisis period reflecting a
concern about further decline in stock prices.
In order to illustrate a more general relationship between the skewness measure
and market movements, the six-day moving average of the skewness measure and the
daily KOSPI200 levels over the whole sample period are plotted in Figure 5.
Figure 5 about here
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It can be readily seen that there are systematic divergences between call and put
option prices. Over the pre-crisis period, the six-day moving average of skewness
measures were greater than zero almost every day. The most right-skewed period is
around late August 1997, when the skewness measure reached +62.4%. This extremely
high positive value of average skewness measure could possibly be due to an anticipation
of a stock market rally following a period of continuous declin. Although negative
skewness measures were seen around late September 1997, this disappeared immediately.
In consequence, option traders did not appear to take into account the various economic
woes over the pre-crisis period until at least the middle of October, 1997.
The skewness measures show a particularly significant negative value just before
and immediately after the news of the downgrading of Korean foreign debt on October
23, 1997, suggesting a strong assessment of downside risk. The most left-skewed period
for the whole sample period is around December 23, 1997, when the six day average
reached –227.3%. Around that time period, the political concern was fuelling uncertainty
about the future. Two presidential candidates had announced that they would renegotiate
the agreement with the IMF if they got elected which further undermined foreign investor
confidence. However, as the newly elected president pledged on December 24, 1997, to
perform as per IMF agreement terms the KOSPI200 began to turn upward and attained a
level of 65 points (which was almost 60% higher than the lowest level in late December,
1997) by late January, 1998. Although the skewness measure also began to increase from
that day, it remained less than zero until February 23, 1998, over which time the
KOSPI200 increased by nearly 60%. This inverse relationship between the skewness
measure and the subsequent movement of the underlying market convincingly rejects the
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hypothesis that negative skewness forecasts a falling market, a result consistent with
Gemmill (1996).
5. Conclusions
The Korean financial crisis was a period of extreme financial volatilities which
does not appear to have been anticipated by option traders. In fact traders seem to have
reacted in exactly the wrong direction prior to each major shift in the market.
We initially show that the volatility implicit in option prices, over the period
immediately preceding the crisis, follow a pattern which is contrary to expectations. If
option prices are set based on investors’ aggregate assessment of future market
movements then, over the period preceding the crisis, the implied volatility of the puts
should be significantly greater than that of otherwise similar call options. Results in this
study show that, contrary to expectation, the implied volatility of calls is significantly
greater than that of put options. Moreover, immediately after the downgrading of
Korea’s sovereign debt by Standard and Poors, put implied volatility exceeded the
implied volatility of calls suggesting an impending worsening of the stock market.
However, option traders were once again proven wrong when the market

moved

significantly in the opposite direction.
We next employed the methodology developed in Gemmill (1996) to compute a
skewness measure of the volatility smile (see equation 1). Results once again point
towards a total mis-judgement on the part of option traders despite the string of negative
signals that preceded the onset of the crisis.
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Table 2 .1
KOSPI20 0 o ptio ns co ntracts vo lume by mo nth fo r the s ample pe rio d fro m J uly, 19 97
thro ug h M arch, 1 998
Trading

Call

Put

Total

Daily

Month/Year

Days

Volume

Volume

Volume

Average

July/1997

21

14,876

11,281

26,157

1,246

Aug/1997

25

53,471

39,813

93,284

3,731

Sep/1997

23

162,727

64,127

226,854

9,863

Oct/1997

26

804,576

148,861

953,437

36,671

Nov/1997

25

1,170,215

242,010

1,412,225

56,489

Dec/1997

22

1,409,916

324,551

1,816,467

82,567

Jan/1998

22

450,326

447,751

898,077

40,822

Feb/1998

24

520,414

497454

1,017,868

42,411

Mar/1998

26

487,909

476,613

964,522

37,097

So urce : M arket Statis tics , the Ko re a Stock Ex change

Table 2 .3
Eco no mic woes bre we d fo r mo nths aro und the curre ncy bailo ut
Date

Economic woes

KOSPI200
(W / US$)
71.00
(852.7)
65.04
(883.1)

23-Jan-97

Hanbo, 14th largest company in Korea, defaults on loans

19-Mar-97

Sammi Steel Co., a unit of Korea’s 26th largest company, defaults on
loans

21-Apr-97

Jinro, Korea’s largest distillery, collapses

70.60
(890.7)

2-Jul-97

Thai central bank announces a managed float of the baht and calls on
the IMF for “technical assistance”

81.63
(885.7)

15-Jul-97

Kia Motors Co., Korea’s eighth largest company, fails to make some
payments on its US$ 10 billion debt

78.28
(889.9)

19-Aug-97

Won hits record low of 901 to the dollar

2-Oct-97

S&P Co. cut credit ratings for three Korean commercial banks

22-Oct-97

Korean government announces it would take over debt-ridden Kia
Motors Co

76.67
(901.0)
66.72
(912.0)
63.12
(913.9)

23-Oct-97

S & P Co. cuts rating of Korean foreign debt in response to Kia
bailout

63.44
(917.8)

24-Oct-97

Korean currency plunges and stock price takes biggest single-day
drop in history following a cut rating by S&P

59.60
(927.1)

28-Oct-97

Won ends at 953 to US$ despite central bank intervention

51.57
(953.2)

Date

Economic woes

7-Nov-97

Markets openly speculate that Korea will have to go to IMF to help
defend won, which ends at 979.9 with traders targeting the 1,000
barrier. KOSPI 200 ends down 7.39% at 53.75

10-Nov-97

Won closes at 999 to the dollar

17-Nov-97

Korea central bank announces it will no longer defend 986 to US$.
Won immediately falls its daily limit down to 1008.6.

54.6
(999.0)
51.21
(1008.6)

18-Nov-97

Korea central bank suggests to finance ministry that Korea should
seek an IMF bailout loan

51.02
(1010.0)

20-Nov-97

Won plunges to its new limit-down level of 1139

KOSPI200
(w/US$)
53.75
(974.7)

50.88
(1139.0)

21-Nov-97

Finance ministry official announces Korea discussing details of
bailout package with IMF

53.49
(1051.0)

3-Dce-97

Korea and IMF sign agreement to provide $57 billion bailout
loan

41.38
(1195.0)

19-Dec-97

Presidential election and the first shift of power by vote to the
opposition

44.65
(1576.5)

23-Dec-97

Won hit the record low of 1952.7

24-Dec-97

New elected president pledges to perform IMF agreements

40.91
(1952.7)
39.08
(1822.7)

Table 4 .1
Summa ry Statis tics o n Implie d Vo latility and Ske wness
The table reports summary statistics for implied volatilities (ISD) calculated from at-the-forward
call and put options with nearest contract month. OBS denotes number of observation in each
sample period. Bracked numbers are standard deviations, except where denoted as t values.
a

denotes t value (calculated assuming unequal variances) significant at the 1% level. Skewness

measures are calculated from puts 2% below the forward price and calls 2 % above the forward
price, using the equation (4.3)
For at-the-forward options
Period

OBS

10/Jul/97 - 7/Mar/98

182

Average of
Put & Call
ISD
%
63.31

( Whole Period)
10/July/97- 22/Oct/97

78

27.42

( Pre-Crisis)
23/Oct/97 – 7/ Mar/98
(Crisis)

104

90.23

Put
ISD
%

Call
ISD
%

Difference in
Put-Call

Skewness
Measure
%

71.67

54.95

16.72

-26.67
a

(53.57)

(26.63)

( t = 3.89)

24.99

29.86

-4.87

(9.29)

(6.45)

( t = 3.53) a

106.69

73.78

32.91

(45.57)

(20.38)

( t = 6.93) a

10.96
-54.9

Table 4 .2
Co mpariso n o f v o latilities at and o ut-o f-the -mo ne y
The table compares the implied volatility from at-the-forward options with that from 2% out-ofthe-forward options by subsample. (±2%) denotes an option which has an exercise price 2%
above or below the forward price. Bracketed numbers are standard deviations, except where
denoted as t values. The differences between 2% out-of-the forward and at-the-forward options
are insignificant in all three subsamples at 0.01 level.
No of

Puts

Puts

Period

OBS

(-2%)

(0%)

10/Jul/97-7/Mar/98

182

72.0

(Whole Period)
10/Jul-22/Oct/97

78

(Pre-Crisis)
23/Jul/97-7/Mar/98
( Crisis)

104

Calls

Calls

Difference

(0%)

(+2%)

Difference

71.7

-0.33

55.0

54.7

-0.3

(53.0)

(53.8)

(t=0.059)

(28.2)

(27.3)

(t=0.101)

25.6

25.0

-0.65

29.9

29.1

-0.79

(8.5)

(8.52)

(t=0.475)

(6.45)

(5.82)

(t=0.80)

106.8

106.7

-0.09

73.8

73.6

-0.02

(45.1)

(46.4)

(t=0.016)

(23.1)

(20.5)

(t=0.03)

Table 4 .3
Dis tributio nal Statis tics fo r Daily re turns fo r KOSPI200
The table shows the breakdown of daily log return on KOSPI200 between July 10, 1997, and
March 7, 1998, into two groups on the news that S&P downgrade Korea’s foreign debt rating on
October 23, 1997.

a

denotes that skewness is significant at 5% level (expected values for a

distribution is skewness = 0). Normality of daily return distribution is tested using the Lillifos
table with α=0.05, and variances are estimated. Sd denotes standard deviation and annualised
standard deviation is calculated multiplying Sd by square root of number of trading days per
annum.
Period

No of
OBS

Mean (%)

Sd (%)

Annualised
Sd (%)

Skewness

10/Jul/97-22/Oct/97

78

-29.8

1.64

28.40

0.707a

104

-2.0

4.06

70.32

-0.022

(pre-crisis)
23/Oct/97-3/Mar/98
( crisis)

Table 4 . 4
Ske wness me as ure reg ressed o n daily re turn
The table reports regression results from equation (4.4) for skewness measures between July 10, 1997 and
March 7, 1998, for each of two subsamples. The coefficients are fitted by OLS. (SE) denotes standard
error. DW denotes the Durbin-Watson values. OBS is the number of observation. SKEW t is the skewness
measure defined as percentage deviation of 2% out-of-the-forward call implied volatility from 2% out-ofthe-forward put implied volatility on given day t. KORt is the ln (St /St-1), where St is closing KOSPI200
level.
than two with p-value close to zero in both Pre-Crisis and Crisis sample, indicate positive

Group
Pre-Crisis
Crisis

α
(p-value)
0.1163
(0.0003)
-0.5472
(0.0001)

β
(p-value)
0.1318
(0.2247)
0.4189
(0.0001)

R2

DW

N

0.0193

0.885
(0.0001)
0.6946
(0.0001)

78

0.1409

104

Table 4 .5
Autoco rre log ram o f Ske wness me as ure and Daily re turn se ries
Skewness measures are calculated from 2% out-of-the-forward call and put options implied
volatilities, using the equation (4.3). Daily returns are computed by multiplying square root of
number of trading days per annum by ln(St+1 /St )
Skewness measure

Daily return

Lag
Length
1

Autocorrelation
0.6807(0.0741)

Partial
Autocorrelation
0.6807

Autocorrelation
0.2594(0.0743)

Partial
Autocorrelation
0.2594

2

0.5368(0.1028)

0.1369

-0.1014(0.0791)

-0.1808

3

0.5216(0.1172)

0.2147

-0.0509(0.0798)

0.0299

4

0.5329(0.1293)

0.1787

-0.1829(0.0800)

-0.2153

5

0.4138(0.1409)

-0.1051

-0.1997(0.0823)

-0.1019

6

0.3685(0.1474)

0.0423

-0.1018(0.0849)

-0.0840

7

0.4233(0.1524)

0.1625

0.1843(0.0856)

0.2186

8

0.4003(0.1587)

-0.0025

0.2328(0.0878)

0.0818

9

0.3298(0.1642)

-0.0161

0.0500(0.0911)

-0.0260

10

0.2478(0.1678)

-0.1155

0.0300(0.0913)

0.0172

11

0.2753(0.1698)

0.0513

-0.0039(0.0913)

0.0115

12

0.2395(0.1722)

-0.0308

-0.0810(0.0913)

0.0167

13

0.1838(0.1740)

-0.0264

-0.0549(0.0913)

0.0451

14

0.1576(0.1751)

-0.0018

-0.0352(0.0917)

-0.0449

15

0.1762(0.1759)

0.0089

0.1576(0.1751)

-0.0095

16

0.1573(0.1768)

-0.0029

0.1762(0.1759)

0.0035

17

0.1029(0.1776)

-0.0257

0.0433(0.0921)

0.0318

18

0.0687(0.1779)

-0.0536

0.0342(0.0922)

-0.0009

19

0.1168(0.1781)

0.1062

0.0540(0.0923)

0.0705

20

0.2045(0.1785)

0.2051

0.0732(0.0925)

0.0639

21

0.2348(0.1798)

0.1433

-0.0546(0.0928)

-0.0707

22

0.2174(0.1815)

0.0041

-0.1180(0.0930)

-0.0603

23

0.1959(0.1829)

-0.0801

-0.0787)0.0938)

-0.0487

24

0.1754(0.1840)

-0.0821

-0.0004(0.0942)

0.0449

Table 4 .6
Reg ress io n res ults o f ske wness o f v o latility s mile (SKWEt) ag ains t re turn o n KOSPI20 0
The table reports regression results from equation (4.5) by subsamples defined as Pre-Crisis and
Crisis. The coefficients are fitted by maximum likelihood method. Bracketed numbers are p
values. N denotes the number of observation in the sub sample.
Period

AR
order

Pre-

1

Crisis
Crisis

1

α

β

DW

Regression
2

Total

N

2

(p-value)

R

R

0.1800

2.0686

0.0573

0.3236

78

(0.0566)

(0.0846)

(0.6211)

(0.0515)

(0.0365)

-0.5421

0.4164

2.3163

0.2293

0.5057

104

(0.1503)

(0.0765)

(0.9498)

(0.0005)

(0.0001)

(SE)

(SE)

(p-value)

(p-value)

0.1120

Table 4 .7
Daily Re turn reg ressed o n o ne day lagge d ske wness me as ure
The table reports ordinary least squares estimates from equation (4.10):KORt =α+βSKEWt-1+ε t.
SE denotes standard error. All Durbin-Watson d statists (DW) are significant at 0.01 level. OBS
is the number of observations in the subsample.
Group

Pre-Crisis

Crisis

α
(SE)
(p-value)
0.1061

β
(SE)
(p-value)
-0.06137

(0.0316)

(0.1092)

(0.0012)

(0.5759)

0.1021

0.1939

(0.0819)

(0.0865)

(0.2152)

(0.0272)

R2

DW
(p-value)

OBS

0.0042

0.8835

77

(0.0001)
0.0469

1.4678
(0.0023)

103

Table 4 .8
Reg ress io n res ults o f Daily re turn o n KOSPI20 0 o n day t (KORt) ag ains t Ske wness
me as ure o n day t-1 (SKEWt-1 )
The table reports regression results from equation (4.11) by subsamples defined by Pre-Crisis
and Crisis. The coefficients are fitted by maximum likelihood method. SE denotes standard error.
OBS denotes the number of observation in the subsamples.
Period

AR
Order

Pre-Crisis

1

Crisis

1

α
(SE)
(p-value)
0.0933

β
(SE)
(p-value)
0.0949

DW
(p-value)

R2

Total
R2

OBS

1.6997

0.0172

0.3252

77

(0.0662)

(0.0901)

(0.0818)

(0.1624)

(0.2958)

0.1024

0.1951

1.9404

0.0390

0.1143

103

(0.1032)

(0.1006)

(0.3667)

(0.3232)

(0.0551)

